Lecture series by Dr Nuur Hassan (01/09/19 to 04/09/19). Part one

Is Somalia’s clan system the root cause of its political failure?

Reflecting on the ‘one that got away’- Clan and its role in politics, peace and security and finally in resource sharing.

In this lecture series, Nuur grapples with one of most enduring and problematic topics in Somalia’s political history- the role of clan and what is of clan in Somalia’s politics. Lectures are brief and precise in nature- in that their aim was not and is not to be verbose, but rather intellectually grounding and thinking tools.

There are four lectures in the series; lecture one opens the debate with a new theory. Lecture two attempts to answer the guiding question with specific answers. Lecture three sets out a concise analysis of how Somali clan members develop and internalise clan-centric interests. Lecture four- the last of the series attempts to offer a solution to the central problem.

Lecture 1: Birth of a theory

If you( like me) think a lot and engage in critical reflection of the dire political and social situation in Somalia, you might have asked yourself multiple questions with lots of ‘whats and whys’, for example you might have asked;

1. What are the major root causes of Somalia’s political crises and its never-ending conflicts?

2. Why others in the region seem to have the magic bullet when it comes to way out of political impasse, when Somalis are incapable of putting their houses in order?

There may well be other fundamental questions asked while thinking around the subject, but these are the key ones.

Now, wanting to get answers for the above questions, one would want to seek external inputs from others. This is what I have done and had been doing for the past few years.

I have asked Somalis ( lettered and unlettered), smart and not too smart, the same above questions, and more often than not, I got one single almost universal answer, which blames our clan system( the Somali clan system) for our political failures.

The verdict is that, we are where we are politically as a country, because ‘our clan system, which is the key driver of our political system’ lets us down.

At this stage, I had two options, one- to leave the subject alone, accept the verdict passively and curse our clan system for letting us down, or two- to critically engage with the verdict with the view of developing a conceptual framework, which enables me and others to think more about the subject.

I am pleased to say that I had adopted the second option, and in doing so I spent more days and months critically engaging with the subject with the sole aim of building some form of theoretical framework, which will help us understand our ‘clan-driven political system’ better.

Born out of my thinking is a new framework called the theory of ‘ Clan-Nation disjoint’, which is still evolving. My new theory is based on three premises and they are as follows;

1. There is an internalised perception (by the Somali clans) of persistence divergence between clan and national interest.

2. Clans developed and internalised (over the years) their own interests based on two pillars; Pillar one: Resource acquisition and pillar two: availability of security for their members

3. There is a widespread disapproval among Somali elites of clan identity promotion- publicly, although [they] privately and politically approve it to serve specific interests of the clan, whose members are either in power or closer to power.

Yes, we have a ‘clan driven political system’, but the clan per se is not what causes our political system to fail…. what is causing us to fail- according to my theory is something else. See lecture two

Lecture 2: Answering the question: Is Somalia’s clan system the root cause of its political failure?

In lecture 1, I have spoken about the ‘great deal of thinking’, which I had done in the last few years around the continued failures of Somalia’s political system. I said I talked to many people with different cognitive abilities as well as wide-ranging perspectives.

The question I was (mainly) asking was why our political system is failing? When the rest in the region seem to transition more easily?

Almost all the answers given to me were ‘we are failures in politics’ because our political system is based on clan, which is a seed for destruction. For some reason, I was not happy with the answers and (as I said earlier) embarked on more and more thinking.

Eventually, a theory was born out of my thinking, it is called the theory of ‘ Clan-Nation disjoint’ see the premises this theory uses to launch its proposition on my previous lecture.

Before I submit my answer to the above question having used ‘Clan-Nation disjoint’ as a thinking tool, I would like you the reader to get some basic facts straight!!

What is clan? Is it different from tribe? Without getting into too abstract and on anthropological journey. Clan is basically an outgrowth of one’s extended family, a group or groups of people joined by a common kinship. When your immediate family gets larger and larger you are heading into the clan territory.

In the context of Somalia (ancient as well as contemporary), when family got larger and larger with resource being limited, conflicts over the utilisation of scarce resources had ensued. To counteract this and find solutions, more and more groups have joined hands in marriage and in other social connections to form supper-clan identity.

What is tribe and is it different from clan? Strictly speaking, in the Somalia’s context, what we have is clan not a tribe- the latter’s dictionary meaning emphasises on the ‘social and the political cohesiveness between group of people’

Now, having cleared that out, let us comeback to my answer according to my theory.

Is Somalia’s clan system the root cause of its political failure? My answer to this question is as follows

NO, clan is not be blamed for the failure, YES, clan is a key driver and the most conspicuous component of our political system (just see our current power-sharing formula 4.5). So, who is to be blamed and why most of Somalis (lettered or unlettered) found easy to scapegoat clan?

Here is my full answer to this question.

I will argue that, the source of our political failure can be traced to two camps; The first camp sits with our political class and the way they utilise clan when engaging with the country’s political system. They stigmatise or appear to stigmatise clan and anything of clan publicly, while [they] politically and privately promote its use for their own interests.

This public- private divergence of clan and what is of clan, created power abuses, social conflicts and eventually pushed the development of the second camp.

The second camp sits with the clan members outside the ruling elites, which I call the masses or the ruled. In response to the use of clan in private for political and resource acquisition by the elites, the clan members have( over the years) developed and internalised a narrowly defined and inward-looking clan interests, which is according to this thinking, wholly incompatible with the national interest.

In short, any major clan in Somalia who is happened to be outside the power, perceives a divergence between their clan interests and the national interest- hence Clan- Nation disjoint.

The problem is therefore in the utilisation of clan in public vs private by our political classes, as well as the narrowly defined and internalised inward-looking interests developed by Somali clan members over the years-clan per se is not to be blamed!!

Lecture 3: Analysis of how Somali clan members develop and internalise clan-centric interests.

In lecture 2, I have attempted (while using Clan-Nation Disjoint as theoretical framework) to answer the above question. My answer was clear and unambiguous, in that I had dismissed and resisted from the notion that scapegoated clan for our political failures.

Instead, I argued that the problem of our political failures is situated in two camps- one populated by the elite, where clan and what is of clan is publicly stigmatised, while privately (it) is promoted and used for political and resource acquisition by the very elite.

The other camp is populated by the masses of Somalia’s clan members- the ruled, in this camp, members of different clans developed and internalised a narrowly defined and inward-looking clan interest, which is by its nature, wholly incompatible with the national interests.

In a simple and straightforward sentence, the political class uses clan privately to gain leg up, while publicly shunning it- private- public dichotomy. The masses witnessed this divergence and abuse of clan power by the elites, in response ( and wrongly so) they had developed and internalised clan-centred interests, which they view as different from the nation’s interests.

In this lecture, my aim is to analyse how Somali clan members develop and internalise clan-centric interests. In doing so I will draw on the first two key premises of Clan-Nation Disjoint theory- they are as follows

1. There is an internalised perception by the Somali clans of persistence divergence between clan and national interests.

2. Clan members developed and internalised (over the years) their own interests based on two cardinal pillars- Security and Resources

To unpack the above premises in order to understand the subject matter, we need to revisit the Somalia’s social history as a nation- looking at clan systems, resource sharing as well as social connections. We also need to revisit the Somalia’s sorry political history-starting from post-independent Somalia to-date. (because of space, I will be brief in both)

The Social history:

I will start with this because it predates our political history. Clan as we defined in my last lecture, simply is an outgrowth of one’s extended family members, in other words when groups who are connected by a common kinship become larger and larger, they form clan and then this very clan joins hands in marriage and in other social connections with other clan members to form super clan identity.

In this social evolution and with limited resources (in grazing, water and other resources) members and/or clan leaders developed (as a necessity for survival) their own clan-centric interests.

These interests are incidentally based on two major pillars: security for the survival of their clan members and resources for the wellbeing of clan members. Security because there are constant conflicts between clans, resources because there are not enough developed resources for everyone in the country.

The political history

Following the birth of Somali republic- independent and hopeful republic, politics had immediately turned ugly, in the sense that our multiparty political system started to resemble our clan systems. Corruption and nepotism ensued, as a result here is where the first premise comes in, i.e. the perception that the clan’s interests are wholly incompatible with the national interests.

Fast forward to 9 years after independent, the military coup d’état allegedly in response to the corruption and nepotism by SYL, totally and publicly scapegoated clan and anything of clan, while manipulating it to maintain power, and without addressing the perception that national and clan interests are incompatible.

Fast forward to our clan-based political system to-date (i.e. 4.5), the ruling elite continues to publicly shun clan, without genuinely addressing the misconception that clan and nation have different interests. This only perpetuates the belief that the state only serves the clan in power and the rest…. Well they must fight and wrestle back power from the ruling clan.

Lecture 4: The solution

In this lecture series, I have stated from the outset that, I spent a great deal of thinking about the unrelenting political failures of Somalia, envying other states in the region for their smooth(ish) solution-oriented political transitioning.

I also shared with you the readers, the overwhelming verdict by Somalis (lettered or unlettered), about whose is to be blamed for our political failures- not surprisingly Clan was widely seen as the devil replicating destructive seeds in our systems.

I also shared with you my dissatisfaction about this verdict, and the need to think more and more in order to understand the problem better. In doing so I come- up with a framework to help me and others study the problem better.

In the second lecture, I attempted (while using Clan-Nation Disjoint as theoretical framework) to answer the guiding question (see above) for the series. My answer was clear and unambiguous, in that I had dismissed and resisted from the notion that scapegoated clan for our political failures, in other words I disagreed with the overwhelming verdict placing the blame on clan and what is of clan.

In the third lecture, I set out to analyse how Somali clan members developed and internalised clan-centric interests in response to what I called a ‘ misplaced perception of persistence divergence between clan and national interests’, in other words clan members perceive that the national interest is completely different from their clan interests.

In this forth and final lecture, I will attempt to offer a solution to the problem- feeling better informed about it, owing to the framework. However, before I present my solution, I would like to make clear that simply understanding the role of clan in our political system or whether its presence in our system is good or evil, cannot and shouldn’t be seen as the end in itself( i.e. the solution), but mere the means to an end ( i.e. to reach the solution, which is to start the process of correct prognosis).

I say so, because Somalia’s problems are multi-faceted, and there are more than one factor at play in our political problems( foreign intervention, colonial legacy, poor education, imported political models, globalisation etc- to name(but) a few).

Here is my solution- so brace yourself and I promise you that I will be brief and precise.

First, let us remind ourselves of the two metaphors I used when I pointed out where our political problems located (see lecture two). I used camps as metaphors to explain where we should be looking at in order to find the problem that is bothering us.

In the first camp you have the ruling elite or the political class- who utilises our clan system and manipulate its structure to maintain power, yet cynically and cunningly stigmatise its public presence. In other words, they use it in their political endeavours, manipulate it in private to give them leg up, but don’t want it to be of public discussion.

In the second camp, you have what I called the masses or the ruled (you and I). we, the public(i.e. the clan members), we see day in day out, our clans and their different hues being used and abused by the ruling elite, we have seen( historically) day in day out, that those in power only do two things when in power, server theirs only, and sometimes their clan interests, therefore as a natural process( over the years) we developed our own clan-centric interests, which is wholly incompatible with the national interest, why because we have been abused by the state and its ruling clique.

Now, since we understand better where our problems are located (i.e. in these two camps), let me put forward my solution.

My solution is in two folds, first we must resist the elite to use and abuse our clan system to gain leg-up in their political and power endeavours, how? We work towards a system that elects them on merit and holds them accountable for their poor performances.

Second and this is the most important solution, we must put forward a convincing argument to all Somalis that we must not shy from discussing clan and what is of clan publicly, with sole view of correcting once and for all the internalised perception that ‘ the individual clan interests are different and wholly incompatible with the national interests’ i.e. the Clan-National disjoint.

This is a fallacy and it needs correction. How? Let me give you a quick example, speak to anyone from any clan in Somalia and ask him/her what is his/her clan interests are?, the answer is clear; every clan wants security/protection and resources for its clan members- plain and simple!

Now ask yourself, in a functioning nation-state with stable government, who provides security to and looks after and distributes the national resources to its citizens? the simple answer is the states(governments).

Now ask yourself another simple question, what are the cardinal obligations of any nation-state? Among others, the two-providing security and protection to its nationals and national resource management will top the list.

If you are still with me, you can see the ‘disjoint’ is now proven incorrect, i.e. the interests of any clan and the national interests are one and the same- that argument is one we need to win publicly and privately.

This brings an end to the lecture series and I thank you friends for been part of it.